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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE-AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL OF ACTION MARKED OFF
CALENDAR AND NOT RESTORED WITHIN
LITIGATION WAS ACTUALLY IN PROGRESS

ONE YEAR, INEFFECTIVE WHERE

In 1936 a stockholder's derivative action was commenced in the Supreme
Court of New York on behalf of a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.
The corporation was a nominal defendant and its former directors were individual defendants. A tremendous amount of legal maneuvering, irrelevant to
the procedural issue of the instant case, has occurred since the action was
commenced. During 1955 and 1956, calendar proceedings in the Supreme
Court became confused. On January 4, 1955, the case was marked off the trial
calendar. On January 27, 1955, defendants obtained a stay of all proceedings
by plaintiff until after a pretrial examination to which plaintiff has not yet
submitted. The case then appeared on the April 20, 1955, "General Call
Calendar of Cases Marked 'Off.'" Three appeals from orders were argued
before the Appellate Division, Second Department, November 28, 1955. Those
appeals were decided February 27, 1956, but pursuant to rule 302 dismissal
should have automatically occurred January 4, 1956.1 On June 11, 1956, a
motion by defendants to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute was
denied, and a motion to strike the complaint for plaintiff's willful failure to
appear for a pretrial examination was denied on the condition that plaintiff
appear for the examination before July 26, 1956. Claiming illness, plaintiff
failed to appear, and judgment was entered dismissing the complaint on August
28, 1956. Plaintiff and the nominal defendant appealed from the examination
order, obtaining reversal and order by the Appellate Division for a hearing on
the question of plaintiff's willfulness concerning the examination. After the
hearing and another motion by defendants to strike the complaint for plaintiff's willful failure to appear for pretrial examination, the motion was granted
and judgment entered in January 1958. Two months later plaintiff began a
new action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York 2 The assertion that the minutes of the supreme court clerk were
conclusive proof of automatic and final dismissal on January 4, 1956, was made
for the first time by defendants on August 4, 1959. By that time defendants
had been party to appeals and had commenced other proceedings. Furthermore,
the rubber stamp entry of dismissal for failure to comply with rule 302 was
1. N.Y.R. Civ. Prac. 302(2):
In the supreme court and county courts a cause hereafter marked "off" or struck
from the trial term or special term calendar or unanswered on a clerk's calendar call,
and not restored within one year thereafter, shall be deemed abandoned, and the
complaint and counterclaim, if any, shall be dismissed without costs for failure
to prosecute, and the clerk shall make appropriate entry to that effect pursuant
to this rule without necessity of further order.
2. Marco v. Dulles, 177 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). This action was begun pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 23, providing that where an action is terminated other
than by voluntary discontinuance, dismissal of complaint for neglect to prosecute or a
final judgment upon the merits, a new action for the same cause may be commenced
within one year.
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undated, all other entries on that page being dated, and the "April 5, 1956
Ready Day Calendar" of Kings County Supreme Court evidences restoration
of the case in accordance with a request by nominal defendants' counsel,
4
including an entry that the action was stayed.3 Dismissal was denied. Defendant6 then moved in the Supreme Court to vacate the January 1958 judgment and to set aside all proceedings after January 4, 1956, for lack of
6
jurisdiction. The motion was granted.5 From a unanimous affirmance the
Court of Appeals, held, reversed, three judges dissenting. Where litigation was
actually in progress and defendants not only did not object to proceedings after
January 4, 1956, but also invoked jurisdiction to serve their own ends, they
are precluded from claiming benefit by the operation of rule 302. Marco v.
Sacks, 10 N.Y.2d 542, 181 N.E.2d 392, 226 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
When an occasion for statutory construction arises, courts generally are
concerned with legislative intent. That is not the case when the proper interpretation of a rule of court is in question. The courts have direct responsibility
for administering and promulgating rules to promote justice and efficiency in
the judicial process. 7 The rules of the supreme court relate to practice and
procedure in that court and, consequently, their enforcement and administration are ordinarily under its control.8 Of course, the Court of Appeals has
power to review final judgments concerning supreme court rules whether they
are appealed on constitutional9 or other grounds. 10
Mere failure of a party to adhere to the procedure prescribed by a court
rule does not deprive the court of jurisdiction."- In the interest of preserving
substantial rights it has the power to overlook or provide relief against the
violation of a technical rule that, by a literal interpretation, would cause those
rights to be sacrificed.' 2 There is apparently no reason why a court should
not have the discretion to overlook or provide affirmative relief in the case of
a rule that has been declared "automatic and self-executing."' 1 Indeed, when
a court has thought that the circumstances justified relief, it has opened dis3. In view of the clerk's immediately preceding, undated entry of dismissal it defies
explanation how he determined compliance with Kings County Supreme Court rule 17(e),
governing procedure for restoration to the calendar of causes and proceedings marked
"off," and why a minute was entered that the action was stayed.
4. Marco v. Dulles, supra note 2.
5. Marco v. Sachs, 25 Misc. 2d 763, 202 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
6. Marco v. Sachs, 12 A.D.2d 774 (2d Dep't 1961).
7. Evans v. Backer, 101 N.Y. 289, 4 N.E. 516 (1886); Martine v. Lowenstein, 68 N.Y.
456, 51 How. Pr. 353 (1877).
8. Ibid.
9. See Rose v. Brenner, 6 N.Y.2d 848, 160 N.E.2d 88, 188 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1959).
10. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960), reversing 5 A.D.2d 303, 171 N.Y.S.2d 594 (3d Dep't 1958);
Delcambre v. Delcambre, 210 N.Y. 460, 104 N.E. 950 (1914).
11. Matter of Benedict, 239 N.Y. 440, 147 N.E. 59 (1925).
12. Broome County Farmers' Fire Relief Ass'n v. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 239 App.
Div. 304, 268 N.Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 264 N.Y. 614, 191 N.E. 591
(1934).
13. Wheelock v. Wheelock, 3 A.D.2d 25, 26, 157 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (1st Dep't 1956),
aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 706, 148 N.E.2d 311, 171 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1958).
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missals caused by the operation of rule 302.14 Nothing would seem to prevent
a court from completely overlooking the effect of rule 302 if, as in this case,
a desirable result could not be achieved by affirmative action to open a default
automatically entered.
In order to avoid what the Court considered an undesirable result of
automatic dismissal pursuant to rule 302, it held in the instant case that the
rule never seems to have been intended to effect dismissal when litigation was
actually in progress. On that basis the Court appears to have interpreted the
rule rather than merely exercised discretion to overlook its operation. Assuming
that the Court rested its decision on interpretation, it then proceeded to
supplement and support the result. The Court said that defendants waived
any benefit they could have claimed from the operation of the rule by not
only participating in appeals but also initiating further proceedings after the
alleged date of dismissal.1 5 Defendants' argument that the operation of rule
302 caused all further proceedings to be a nullity was rejected.10 In rejecting
that argument the Court suggested it could be accepted in a case where there
had been a period of complete inaction, but the same reasoning could not be
applied where plaintiff earlier would have been granted a motion to open the
default. Furthermore, the Court said that the defendants were precluded from
attacking a judgment secured upon their motion and in their favor. 17 The
dissenting judges objected that rule 302 automatically deprived the court of
jurisdiction, that no party could be estopped or waive the effect of its operation
and that the Court of Appeals was without power to nullify a dismissal
already construed to be effective by the Court in which it was entered.
The Court's interpretation of rule 302 seems to fall squarely within its
inherent power over rules administration. It would seem that the long history
of unabating litigation and confused circumstances giving rise to the alleged
dismissal justify continuation of the action, notwithstanding a contrary decision and affirmance in the lower courts. This is not the first time that a finding
of lack of intent to abandon an action has been weighed in favor of a party
seeking to avoid termination of the action as a result of rule 302.18 Although
a literal construction of the rule would make it difficult to say that the phrase
14. See Needleman v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 8 A.D.2d 705, 185 N.Y.S.2d 654
(1st Dep't 1959) (per curiam); People ex rel. Weiss v. Boyland, 3 A.D.2d 738, 160
N.Y.S.2d 235 (1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam); H. R. Jacoby, Inc. v. Kushner, 3 A.D.2d
905, 162 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam); Adriance v. Clifford, 278 App. Div.
735, 103 N.Y.S.2d 285 (3d Dep't 1951) (per curiam).
15. This is implied rather than classical waiver because the intent to relinquish a
known right has to be imputed from the existence of the rule. It seems clear that the
defendants did not have actual knowledge that rule 302 had operated at the time either
of the appeals or their 1956 and 1957 motions to dismiss.
16. For full development see Brief for Defendants-Respondents, pp. 26-28.
17. In support of that proposition the Court cited Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355,
26 N.E.2d 290 (1940); Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N.Y. Supp. 877 (4th
Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 532, 195 N.E. 186 (1935); Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173
N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903).
18. See People ex rel. Weiss v. Boyland, supra note 14.
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"deemed abandoned" only suggests a rebuttable presumption that the rule
applies unless facts show the cause was not actually abandoned, it appears that
the proposers of the rule never considered its possible effect on litigation
actually in progress. Upon recommendation of the rule the Judicial Council
stated that "the principal advantage of such a rule providing for automatic
dismissal of a case which has remained dormant for one year after it has been
marked off or stricken from the calendar is that cases actually dead are legally
buried. . . ."9 The expressed purpose was to prevent revival of stale claims.
Although the declarations of a recommending report should never be considered as conclusive of meaning, they are highly persuasive. Admittedly, the
instant case is an example of protracted litigation, but certainly the claim is
not stale. It should be noted that the Court's assertion that defendants were
precluded from attacking their previous judgment is weak. The authorities
used for that assertion2 ° illustrate not estoppel but rather the principle that
when a party has invoked jurisdiction of a court it may not subsequently pose
a collateral attack that the adjudication was invalid.2 1 An action has been said
to be parallel with previously undertaken proceedings where "the object of
both was the same."2 2 Applying that as a test it appears that the instant case
is a parallel attack upon the 1958 judgment of dismissal.2 3 Notwithstanding
this weakness, the Court's decision rests soundly on its duty to protect parties
from unwarranted injury to substantial rights and the peculiar facts of this
case.2 4 Although there is virtually no possibility that a future case will be
factually identical, the Court's apparent interpretation of rule 302 should be
some comfort to the litigant of an action in actual progress but subjected to
dismissal for mere mistake in calendar procedure.
1.0. D.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED WHERE IssUEs, ALTHOUGH FORmAL, WERE
NOT SUBSTANTIAL AND FAIRLY ARGUABLE

Plaintiff contracted with Proser Enterprises, Inc., a sublessee of nightclub premises, for the exclusive right to operate various concessions in La Vie
Room, now the site of Basin Street East. The agreement provided that plaintiff would lend sublessee 25,000 dollars, repayment to be made from plaintiff's
rent for concession privileges. Subsequently plaintiff contracted with the primary
lessee, Shelton Properties, to secure a right to repayment of the loan from
19. 8 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 383 (1942). (Footnote omitted.)
20. Cases cited note 17 supra.
21. See Krause v. Krause, supra note 17, at 357-59, distinguishing Stevens v. Stevens,
273 N.Y. 157, 7 N.E.2d 26 (1937); cf. Matter of Morrisson, 52 Hun 102, 5 N.Y. Supp. 90
(1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 117 N.Y. 638, 22 N.E. 1130 (1889). See generally Annot., 3
A.L.R. 535 (1919). See the rule as stated id. at 535.
22. Krause v. Krause, supra note 17, at 358-59, 26 N.E.2d at 292.
23. Compare McDonald v. Maybee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Stevens v. Stevens, supra
note 21.
24. Even the court clerk was confused, as is evidenced by the fact that the action
was stayed three months after the undated entry of dismissal was apparently made.
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